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Social group memberships are primarily studied in quasi-experimental contexts, but how can culture, class and
gender be manipulated in true experimental designs? This review highlights the different empirical strategies that
can be used to manipulate “culture” as it relates to race/ethnicity (activation of thinking styles, language, and
priming of cultural constructs), class (social standing, group status, or perceived social status), and gender (role
salience, gender identity, sex hormone administration). I review measurement issues related to manipulation
checks and the problem of what construct is tapped by the manipulation, appropriate control groups, and
intersectional identities or group memberships.

In the last two decades, a growing and compelling body of research
has highlighted the fact that much of what psychology previously
assumed to be universal may, in fact, be subject to cultural inﬂuences
(e.g., the idea that much of psychology is WEIRD: Western, Educated,
Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic; Henrich, Heine & Norenzayan,
2010). Consistent with this line of thinking, a large and substantive body
of research has now demonstrated the myriad ways in which phenomena
across subﬁelds of psychology (social, developmental, cognitive,
abnormal, etc.) can be moderated by social group membership. Nevertheless, much of this literature is based on quasi-experimental and
non-experimental designs, making inferences about causality difﬁcult to
establish. Thus, this review highlights both the existing literature on
manipulations aimed at demonstrating causality and provides a practical
guide for future studies with this aim. The focus will be on three forms of
culture: ethnicity, class, and gender.1
1. Deﬁning “culture”
Since the notion of culture ﬁrst became a subﬁeld of psychological
inquiry approximately three decades ago, discussions of it has explicitly
included three broad social categorizations (ethnicity, class, gender),
albeit the focus has been disproportionately on the ﬁrst (e.g., see
Betancourt and Lopez, 1993). On a basic and operational level, culture
has largely been conceptualized as group membership in that most
cross-cultural studies involve quasi-experimental comparisons between

different racial/ethnic groups; insofar as more precise theoretical deﬁnitions, these have included “systems of meaning” (e.g., Rohner, 1984; as
cited in Betancourt and Lopez, 1993) that include but are not limited to
norms, beliefs, attitudes, values, and roles (see Triandis, 1993). More
recent reviews of culture has further conﬁrmed that culture can be
construed as a constellation of norms and cognitions, transmitted via
groups, that contribute to goals and can be “institutionalized” formally or
not (Lehman et al., 2004). To this end, studies aimed at manipulating
“culture” are primarily focused on manipulating cognitive processes,
schemas, and mindsets associated with speciﬁc cultures.
In the effort to understanding the underlying mechanisms responsible
for cultural differences, a growing number of studies have focused on
“unpacking” culture via mediation models that can identify the precise
cause of an observed group difference and then using subsequent
experimental paradigms to manipulate said cause (e.g., what Heine and
Norenzayan (2006) refer to as Stage 2 in cultural research). That said,
these underlying dimensions responsible for cultural variability may not
always be “cultural” per say; for example, numerous ecological differences between groups exist—e.g., related to resources, religion, and
climate to name a few—that are well-known to inﬂuence the psyche but
that are not strictly cultural (Matsumoto and Yoo, 2006). Most of the
studies covered in this review focus on the cultural dimensions that have
been identiﬁed (e.g. relating to self-construal, thinking style) rather than
the non-cultural ones.
These considerations aside, it is also important to note that the vast
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Although the focus of this review is on ethnicity, class, and gender, it is important to note that still other forms of cultural difference exist–for example, via religion
(see Cohen, 2009).
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paradigm (where, according to the original Kim and Markus (1999)
experiment, the latter were more likely to choose a unique pen) could
inﬂuence the extent to which they exhibited the cultural preference for
uniqueness. While this variation emerged in the default situation where
no efforts were made to change the interpretation of the situation, it did
not emerge in situations where salient considerations about the scenario
were highlighted—namely, when other people's choices were either
saliently taken into consideration or not (Yamagishi et al., 2008). Their
subsequent study yielded similar effects via a slightly different manipulation wherein monitoring by other people were made salient right beforehand or not.
This is also in line with previous work demonstrating a similar closing
of the cultural gap via manipulations of the situational demands.
Yamagishi (1988) had Japanese and European-Americans play a game in
a group wherein the monetary payment for performance was equally
divided among all the members, but participants were given the chance
to exit the group at either a low or high cost. Interestingly, he found that
Japanese participants exited the group more frequently, but that this
difference only emerged under conditions of high cost. Yamagishi (1988)
went to propose that this was because of concern over the free-rider
problem, which is more of an issue in collectivistic contexts than individualistic ones. Thus, in these cases, the experimenters were manipulating culture not by targeting cultural dimensions, but rather, by
changing the social structures set in place that were likely to activate
those cultural tendencies in the ﬁrst place. This institutional framework
represents a compelling and alternative approach to “manipulating”
culture.
Additional evidence for this situational approach comes from studies
on relational mobility. San Martin et al. (2019) found that when participants were told about an organization that either facilitate high or low
relational mobility and imagined themselves as employees there, this was
sufﬁcient to change their thinking styles. Namely, those who believed
that relationships could be changed (i.e., freely entered into or left) were
more likely to think holistically: they had more of an internal locus of
control, made more dispositional attributions, and paid more attention to
the context. This provides yet another example of how manipulating a
socioecological feature of the situation can lead to cultural differences.

majority of the cultural studies that exist have been conducted in the U.S.,
Europe, or East-Asia. While this has provided an excellent basis for understanding culture from East-West perspectives, far less is known about
how these ﬁndings and manipulations would work in Africa, LatinAmerica, the Middle East, and South or Southeast Asia.
2. Manipulations relating to ethnic or national cultural
differences
Manipulations involving facets of ethnic or national culture are the
most studied and most varied of the three forms of culture; they primarily
fall within three categories: manipulations involving instructions to
engage in a culturally-speciﬁc style of thinking (in this case, usually East
versus West), changing the language of the experiment or instrument, or
exposing participants to stimuli representative of a particular ethnic or
national culture. While the instructional and priming manipulations
usually targets a speciﬁc cultural construct, manipulations involving
language are not obviously targeted at a particular cultural construct (see
Table 1). Moreover, more recent conceptualizations of culture have also
relied on altering situational demands to elicit cultural mindsets.
In this section it is also important to note that the term “ethnicity” has
typically been used by cross-cultural researchers to refer to groups like
Asian-Americans, European-Americans, African Americans, LatinoAmericans, etc. Ethnicity can refer to nationality/national origin but
can also be shared across such lines on the bases of common cultural
afﬁliation based on ancestral background, region, afﬁliation or language
(e.g., Betancourt and Lopez, 1993). More broadly, given that culture in
many ways can be conceptualized as “situated cognition” (that is to say,
speciﬁc to location and time; Oyserman and Lee, 2007), it is not surprising that one of the most common ways of studying it involves
examining people groups from distinct geographical locales—distinctions that, in the vernacular, are commonly referred to as
ethnicity. This “situated cognition” conceptualization of culture (Oyserman and Lee, 2007; Oyserman, 2011, 2016; Oyserman et al., 2014) also
lends itself to efforts to manipulate culture: after all, if culture variation is
frequently the product of socialization processes and contextual cues,
then altering the saliency of those features can very likely change the
manifestation of culture itself. In their seminal 2007 chapter on this
topic, Oyserman and Lee canvas the numerous ways in which culture (in
terms of ethnicity) can be primed via a host of different cultural dimensions. In follow-up research, Oyserman et al. (2014) have relied on
neuroscientiﬁc evidence to demonstrate that while universally, individualism and collectivism can be activated, culture dictates the cues that
trigger one dimension over the other through a process of spreading
activation. It follows, then, that individuals from different cultural
backgrounds can have the same cultural “mindsets” momentarily activated via these primes; over time, chronic activation of the same mindsets become what we know of as “culture” (Oyserman, 2016).

2.2. Activating culturally-bound thinking styles
Apart from the institutional framework of understanding cultural
difference, the majority of other culture manipulations focus on changing
a speciﬁc dimension related to ethnic group membership. Of these
different types of cultural manipulations, the most targeted are the ones
that involve explicit direction to engage in a culturally-speciﬁc thinking
style—namely, holistic and dialectical versus analytic and focal, a classic
distinction that can be made between Eastern and Western cultures. A
substantive body of research has shown that while East-Asians tend to
engage in thinking that is non-linear, contextual, and embracing of
contradiction, European-Americans prefer thinking in more linear, focal,
and non-contradictory ways (for review, see Nisbett et al., 2001; for more
recent reviews, see Miyamoto, 2013; Spencer Rodgers et al., 2018). In
line with these ﬁndings, manipulations aimed at changing these
culturally-bound ways of processing information have generally relied on
effortful, autobiographical, reﬂection-based tasks where participants are
told to think about their life in either dialectical or linear ways. Some
variations have limited the context to speciﬁc events or time periods
(e.g., describing events related to when they were accepted into college,
and either focusing on a single event or the interconnectedness between
three separate events—Hideg & Ferris, 2017; thinking about a time
during their teen years when their life was contradictory or stable—Paletz & Peng, 2009), while others were not (e.g., writing down
evidence from their life in support of dialectical or linear thinking after
reading a fabricated news article endorsing one of the styles—Ma-Kellams et al., 2011). Similar to the latter paradigm, an additional
dialectical thinking manipulation asks participants to write about the

2.1. Changing the way situations are conceptualized
This notion of culture as “situated cognition” (Oyserman and Lee,
2007; Oyserman, 2011, 2016; Oyserman et al., 2014) is also consistent
with related approaches to explaining cultural variation like Yamagishi
et al.’s (2008) “institutional approach” where culture is conceived of as a
set of strategies used to adapt to social situations and the incentives that
they carry. Thus, according to this framework, if cultural differences can
be accounted for via individual's default responses to social structures
(based on their beliefs or expectations about how others will react to
these behaviors), then manipulating those structures could also lead to
subsequent changes in culturally-bound actions. In support of this
framework, Yamagishi et al. (2008) demonstrated that altering salient
aspects of the situation could change the “default” response employed by
members of different cultural groups.
To illustrate, Yamagishi et al. found that changing how Japanese and
European-Americans interpreted choice in the classic pen-choice
2
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Table 1
Summary of common manipulations involving ethnic cultural differences.
Manipulations
involving ethnic
cultural differences

Cultural construct

Procedure

Manipulation check/effect of manipulation

Source

Activating thinking
styles

Dialectical vs. analytic
thinking

Dialectical thinking: list 3 life events related
to getting accepted into university and
describe how they were interconnected.
Analytic thinking: list 1 event related to
getting accepted into university and describe
how that single event inﬂuenced their
acceptance.
In a similar modiﬁed version, an afﬁrmative
action policy was framed in dialectical terms
(i.e., in an environment in constant ﬂux) or
not—Hideg & Ferris, 2017).

Those in the analytic condition showed
stronger cause/effect magnitude
correspondence compared to those in the
holistic prime, although no difference between
analytic and control (no prime) conditions
(Spina et al., 2010).
Independent coders coded whether
descriptions contained contradictions or
inconsistencies; those in the dialectical
condition contained more than those in the
analytic condition. Dialectical thinking led to
more favorable attitudes towards afﬁrmative
action, as did afﬁrmative action policy framed
dialectically (Hideg and Ferris, 2017).
Participants wrote a minimum of 2 paragraphs
of evidence from their life in support of the
argument they read; those in the dialecticism
condition showed more explicit in-group
derogation compared to those in the linear
condition.
Number of transition words and qualiﬁers;
marginal differences emerged between
conditions and the thinking manipulation
interacted with a contradiction manipulation to
inﬂuence creativity
Dialectical prime led to more dialectical
attitudes towards contradiction on the subscale
of the Analysis Holism Scale or AHS (Choi
et al., 2007)
Hong Kong Chinese endorsed more Chinese
values when completed the questionnaire in
English
Russian immigrants generated more selfrelated memories in English than in Russian

Spina et al. (2010)
Hideg and Ferris, 2017

Read a fabricated news article about
scientiﬁc evidence in support of dialeciticism
or linear thinking and write 2–3 paragraphs
about evidence in support of this argument
from their life.
Think about a time during adolescence when
the world was full of contradiction or stable.

Write down the beneﬁts of taking the middle
ground or going to extremes

Language

In-group identiﬁcation
and values

Hong Kong Chinese complete a questionnaire
in English vs. Chinese

Self- vs. other-focus in
memory

Russian immigrants complete a
questionnaire in Russian vs. English

Self-concept & values

Chinese-Canadians complete a questionnaire
in English vs. Chinese

Personality

Mexican-American bilinguals complete BFI
(Big Five Inventory) and interview in Spanish
vs. English
Chinese from Mainland China, Taiwan, Hong
Kong & Singapore were tested in Chinese vs.
English
Pronoun circling: participants read texts and
either circled pronouns; experimental
conditions contained pronouns mostly
involving we/us, them/they, or it. Control
condition involved circling adjectives that
were either positive or negative

Categorization

Priming cultural
constructs

I–C

I–C/interdependent vs.
independent selves

Those in the interdependent condition
thought about commonalities whereas those
in the independent condition thought about
differences between themselves and family/
friends.

I–C (private vs.
collective self)

Sumerian warrior story: participants read a
story either about a general choosing a
warrior based on personal gain (private self
condition) or to beneﬁt his family (collective
self condition)
Participants unscrambled sentences
containing either words like individual,
independent, self-contained or group,
friendships, together.

I–C (independence/
interdependence in selfconstruals)

Chinese-Canadians only differed from
European-Canadians when they completed the
questionnaire in Chinese (but not when they
did so in English)
Mexican-Americans reported greater
extraversion, agreeableness and
conscientiousness in English than in Spanish
Only Chinese from China and Taiwan showed
more relational categorization in Chinese than
in English
Those in both the “we” pronoun condition and
positive adjective condition were more likely to
judge ambiguous attitude statements as similar
to their own, but the “we” condition also
produced longer RT (reaction time) when it
came to dissimilarity judgments; “we”
condition also led to more interdependent selfdescriptions on the TST (Twenty Statements
Test; Brewer and Gardner, 1996). pronoun
circling also inﬂuenced judgments about social
obligations and collectivist values (Gardner et
al., 1999)
Manipulation yielded differences in self
construals on the TST (Twenty Statements Test;
Traﬁmow et al., 1991), problem solving speed
on the Embedded Figures Task and self-rated
contextual dependency on the Singelis
Self-Construal task (Kühnen et al., 2001)
Those in the private self condition gave more
idiocentric statements on the TST (20
Statements Test).

Those in the interdependence prime condition
cooperated more and reported being less
concerned with their own gain

Ma-Kellams et al. (2011)

Paletz & Peng (2009)

DeMotta et al. (2016)

Yang and Bond, 1980; Bond
and Yang (1982); see also
Oyserman and Lee (2008)
Marian and Kaushanskaya,
2004; see also Oyserman
and Lee (2008)
Ross et al., 2002; see also
Oyserman and Lee (2008)

Ramírez-Esparza et al.
(2006)
Ji et al. (2004)

Brewer and Gardner (1996);
Gardner et al. (1999)

Traﬁmow et al. (1991);

Traﬁmow et al. (1991)

Utz (2004); see also
Oyserman and Lee (2008)
for review of priming
(continued on next page)
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Table 1 (continued )
Manipulations
involving ethnic
cultural differences

Cultural construct

Procedure

Manipulation check/effect of manipulation

Source

I–C

Subliminal priming: participants were
exposed to words like same, group, team vs. I,
compete, free for 35 ms (milliseconds),
followed by a 75 ms mask.
Participants viewed Chinese vs. American
icons

Prime marginally interacted with valence to
inﬂuence attributions of targets' behaviors and
also changed the strength of the link between
life satisfaction/future outlook.
Chinese Americans made more internal
attributions after American icons and external
attributions after Chinese icons
Mexican-Americans made fewer external
attributions and positive emotions when
primed with American icons
Chinese mentioned more duties when speaking
with the collective self (we); Americans
mentioned more rights when speaking of the
individual self (I). Chinese Americans
mentioned more duties vs. right as a function of
whether their Chinese or American self was
activated.
Those exposed to the afﬁliation primes showed
more choice justiﬁcation when justifying a gift
for a close other as opposed to themselves.

Oishi et al., 2000; see also
Oyserman and Lee (2007)
for review of priming

Attributions

Attributions & positive
emotions

Partipants viewed American and Mexican
icons

Self-concept (individual
vs. collective self)/
Cultural identity

Chinese and American students from
completed 10 sentences that started with “I”
(in English or Chinese) vs. “We” to activate
self-concept. In a second study, the condition
involved completing sentences with the
prompt “I/we being Chinese/American” to
make cultural identity salient.
European-Americans were subliminally
exposed to afﬁliation-related words (e.g.,
friend, partner) or neutral words for 62 ms.

Afﬁliation
(interdependent vs.
independent selfconstrual)
Attention (holistic vs.
analytic)

Changing the
demands of the
situation

I–C

Uniqueness

Analytic/holistic
thinking

European-Americans and Japanese viewed
photos of medium-sized cities in the USA and
Japan
Japanese and European-Americans played a
game in a group wherein monetary rewards
were allocated to group members equally,
but they were given the opportunity to exit
the group at either a high or low cost
The pen-choice paradigm was replicated but
with a manipulation beforehand that altered
the saliency of other people's decisions or
monitoring.
Participants read about an organization that
enabled low vs. high relational mobility and
imagined themselves working there

Across groups, those who viewed the Japanese
cities decide more changes to an animated
vignette compared to those who viewed the
U.S. cities
Cultural differences emerged in the high cost
(of exit) condition, with Japanese participants
exiting more and being less collectivistic,
presumably because of the concern over the
“free-rider” problem
Cultural differences were attenuated with the
saliency of other people's decisions or
monitoring was activated
Those in the high relational mobility condition
made more dispositional biases, analytic
thinking, and internal locus of control

Benet-Martínez et al. (2002)

Kreitler & Dyson (2016)

Hong et al. (2000)

Kimel et al. (2012)

Miyamoto et al. (2006)

Yamagishi (1988)

Yamagishi et al. (2008)

San Martin et al. (2019)
(based on materials from Li
et al., 2015, 2016)

conditions of low contradiction (Paletz and Peng, 2009).

beneﬁts of going to extremes versus the middle ground more generally,
which reﬂects one of the principles of naive dialecticism (DeMotta et al.,
2016). Here, the holistic or dialectical construct centers on the rejection
the Western, Aristotelian law of the excluded middle (i.e., that a statement must be true or false—see Peng and Nisbett, 1999; DeMotta et al.,
2016).
These dialectical thinking style manipulations appear to exert
straightforward effects on self-reported attitudes towards contradiction
(DeMotta et al., 2016) as well as attitudes towards other ideas like
afﬁrmative action (e.g., Hideg and Ferris, 2017). However, their impact
on other outcomes like in-group/outgroup favoritism, judgments of
cause/effects, and creativity appear to be more nuanced and depend on
important moderators, like the level of analysis (e.g., implicit or explicit—Ma-Kellams et al., 2011), the comparison condition (e.g., with a
no-prime control or an analytic thinking condition), and the presence of
other manipulations (e.g., related to contradiction—Paletz & Peng,
2009). For example, in the context of group attitudes, dialectical thinking
impacted explicit attributions about ingroups/outgroups but not implicit
associations with those groups (Ma-Kellams et al., 2011). When it came
to creativity in generating questions to scientiﬁc problems, thinking style
manipulations appeared to interact with low much contradiction there
was in the problem itself, with stronger effects emerging under

2.3. Using language as a cultural manipulation
If manipulations of thinking style represent the category of ethnic
culture manipulations most clearly targeted at a speciﬁc cultural
construct, on the other end of the spectrum are manipulations that rely on
language, which is not clearly linked to a single facet of culture and
instead is meant to induce wide-sweeping and varied changes related to
culture. Unlike other cultural manipulations that can be done with
members of any culture, language manipulations can only be used on
bicultural individuals who can complete measures in their native or a
more recently acquired language—in this case, usually English. A review
of existing cultural psychology studies that have used language manipulations (see Oyserman and Lee, 2008) suggest that these effects can
impact personality dimensions like the Big Five (Ramírez-Esparza et al.,
2009), self-concept (Ross et al., 2002), group identiﬁcation (Yang and
Bond, 1980; Bond and Yang, 1982), categorization (Ji et al., 2004),
memory (Marian and Kaushanskaya, 2004), time orientation (Perez and
Tavits, 2019), and self-enhancement (Lee et al., 2010). Moreover, even
among bicultural and bilingual individuals, language ﬂuency itself may
not be entirely stable, but rather, can be inﬂuenced by other manipula-
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In contrast, the other commonly used priming technique that targets
ethnic culture involves activation of broader cultural values rather than
speciﬁc norms about the nature of the self: after priming Hong Kong
Chinese with cultural icons (American ﬂag, Chinese dragon, Capitol
Building, the Great Wall, etc.) versus geometric ﬁgures in a control
condition, these bicultural individuals made attributions consistent with
the culture primed: American icons led to more internal attributions
whereas Chinese icons led to more external attributions (Hong et al.,
2000). Subsequent studies showed similar effects when Chinese Americans were primed with cultural icons (e.g., Mount Rushmore, Mickey
Mouse, a rice farmer; Benet-Martínez et al., 2002).
Along a related vein, primes of the physical environments found in
Japan versus the U.S. were also effective in eliciting culturally-bound
attention. When Miyamoto et al. (2006) presented both Japanese and
European-Americans with photos of street views from medium-sized
cities in the U.S. and Japan, they found that both groups were better at
detecting changes in the context of an animated scene after seeing the
images of Japanese cities compared to the American ones.
The majority of these cultural primes have relied on supraliminal
exposure. Less commonly used are subliminal cultural primes. Nevertheless, recent studies have suggested that they work in similar ways. To
illustrate, Kimel et al. (2012) ﬂashed afﬁliation-related or neutral words
to European-Americans and found that the subliminal exposure to
afﬁliative words made the participants behave in more interdependent
ways—in this case, engage in greater choice justiﬁcation after making a
decision for a close other.
Regardless of the method of exposure, one potential critique of the
culture and priming literature is the theoretical (or potentially semantic)
issue of whether it is possible to prime a construct as complex as culture.
However, although the term “priming culture” may be used loosely,
closer examination of these aforementioned studies indicate that in most
cases (with the exception of the paradigms involving cultural icons—e.g.,
Hong et al., 2000), researchers are actually priming speciﬁc features of
cultural differences–most frequently, self-construal (i.e., independence
versus interdependence) or thinking styles (i.e., analytic or holistic).
Thus, part of the challenge is to draw appropriate and precise conclusions
about what these paradigms can and cannot demonstrate about causality.
While one can arguably make the argument that culturally-bound ways of
seeing the self and thinking about the world causes differences in
cognition, emotion or behavior, it is much more of a leap to posit that
culture in general causes these divergences. Yet even in the case of the
former, the issue of causality is compounded by the possibility that
priming one feature of culture may naturally prime related features of
culture—a question that will be revisited in the subsequent discussion on
limitations and future/directions.

tions, like exposure to cultural icons (Zhang et al., 2013).
2.4. Priming cultural constructs
Apart from dialectical thinking and language, priming cultural concepts occupies the largest category of manipulations that targets
ethnicity. Here, “priming” is used loosely insofar as it refers to paradigms
whose typical goal is to activate speciﬁc cultural schemas (e.g.,
individualism-collectivism), although in certain cases (e.g. in the case of
cultural icons), such speciﬁcity may not be present. As such, they can take
the form of reading passages (e.g., the Sumerian warrior story—Traﬁmow et al., 1991), unscrambling sentences (containing words
related to cultural values, Utz, 2004), being exposed to visual images
(e.g., cultural icons—Benet-Martínez et al., 2002), reﬂecting on oneself
in the context of close others (Traﬁmow et al., 1991), and word searches
(e.g., pronoun circling—Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Gardner et al., 1999).
Oyserman and Lee (2007); Oyserman and Lee (2008) have extensively
reviewed the culture and priming literature in the context of
individualism-collectivism (I–C) and have found that the priming paradigm matters less than the outcome of interest (i.e., priming I–C appears
to consistently work across the methods described below, but the
magnitude of the effect appears to be stronger in some domains–i.e.,
certain categories of outcomes, like cognitive variables–than others). For
the purposes of this review, the priming culture manipulations are
treated as conceptually different from the aforementioned dialectical or
holistic thinking paradigms because of the difference in intent and the
precise cultural construct activated. While the previously discussed
literature on dialecticism focused on changing the way people thought
about and processed information about the world around them, the
literature on priming culture focuses almost exclusively on promoting
individualistic or collectivistic values. In other words, the former is about
how to think, and the latter is about what to want, and although both are
part of the deﬁnition of culture discussed in the introduction, they
represent different facets of cultural difference.
Given the breadth and depth of Oyserman and Lee's meta-analysis
(2008) and review (2007), this section will not reiterate all their ﬁndings; however, it may be helpful to summarize and highlight several key
points regarding the culture and priming literature. In almost all such
cases, the cultural construct of interest manipulated is independent
versus interdependent selves. The pronoun circling paradigm (Brewer
and Gardner, 1996; Gardner et al., 1999) involves reading a text that
contains mostly the pronouns “we”/“us” vs. “them/they” vs. “it” and
circling such pronouns; in the control condition, the task involves circling
positive or negative adjectives; other studies have found that this
manipulation even works in languages other than English (e.g., German
and Dutch—Kuhnen, Hannover & Schubert, 2001; van Baaren et al.,
2003, as cited in Nisbett et al., 2001). The other paradigms activate
similar comparisons, albeit often without a non-cultural control group:
one paradigm by Traﬁmow et al. (1991) asks participants to think about
commonalities versus differences between themselves and friends or
family; in the other commonly used paradigm developed by Traﬁmow
et al. (1991), participants read a story about a warrior who makes decisions for personal gain or collective beneﬁt; in the sentence unscrambling task, the words contain similar references to individualistic or
collectivistic values: “individual,” “independent,” “self-contained” versus
“group,” “friendships,” “together.” It's important to note that although
these paradigms were originally developed to activate different cultural
selves and generally found evidence that interdependent primes led to
more interdependent self views (e.g., Brewer and Gardner, 1996; Traﬁmow et al., 1991) and collectivistic values (e.g., Gardner et al., 1999; Utz,
2004), subsequent studies have shown that this can have downward
consequences for related cultural differences, such as thinking or attentional styles (e.g., both the reﬂection manipulation about similarities/differences and the pronoun circling task have been shown to shape
performance on the Embedded Figures Task, a visual test that measures
context dependence— Kuhnen, Hannover & Schubert, 2001).

2.5. Activating ethnic/racial identity
Although the study of cultural study does not frequently intersect
with the work on stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination, it is
worthwhile to note that many classic studies of stereotype threat/lift/
reactance involve manipulations that remind the participant of their
ethnic or racial identity (not to mention gender identity). For example,
when participants are asked to indicate their race (or gender) on a demographic form prior to an academic test (for a recent review, see
Spencer et al., 2016), this may be as much of a prime of their social group
identity as it is a prime of the stereotypes that apply to members of their
group. Although the notion of “culture” (as deﬁned here) is not typically
the focus of these studies, it may nevertheless be useful to consider these
paradigms as additional ways in which ethnic culture or at least ethnic
identiﬁcation, broadly speaking, can be made salient.
2.6. Interim summary: cultural manipulations related to ethnic differences
Cultural manipulations based on ethnic differences have been widely
studied and rely on a substantial corpus of varied techniques that include
5
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manipulations involving highlighting situational cues, explicit direction
concerning thinking styles, language of the instruments, and both supraliminal as well as subliminal exposure to cultural concepts. Each
category of manipulation is subject to its own set of advantages and
limitations. Increasing the saliency of situational considerations appears
to be an indirect approach; these ﬁndings are suggestive of the notable
ways in which cultural differences can be attributable to non-cultural
causes (e.g., incentive structures, risk and rewards). Activation of
culturally-bound thinking styles most clearly reﬂect a measurable
outcome (e.g., analytic or holistic thinking), but the strength of this
manipulation varied across studies and largely depended on the target. In
terms of the robustness of the effect, most of the aforementioned studies
found signiﬁcant differences except for Paletz and Peng (2009), who
found that only marginal differences emerged on the manipulation check
between the dialectical and linear thinking conditions. Moreover, the
success of the manipulation depends on the cultural group being targeted: Spina et al. (2010) found that differences emerged between analytic versus holistic conditions but no difference emerged between the
analytic and control condition among Canadians, presumably because
analytic thinking was already the default, culturally normative thinking
style being employed even when no direction was given.
Manipulations involving language and cultural priming appear to be
better documented (see Oyserman and Lee, 2007, 2008), but language
manipulations, like thinking manipulations, appear to depend on the
participant's cultural group—for example, Ji et al. (2004) tested Chinese
from China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore in Chinese and English,
but only Chinese from China and Taiwan categorized more relationally in
Chinese—or
the
method
of
measurement—for
example,
Mexican-Americans rated themselves as lower in sociability, extraversion, and agreeableness in Spanish than in English (Ramírez-Esparza
et al., 2006) but acted more sociably in their actual behavior (Ramírez-Esparza et al., 2009). Although it is beyond the scope of this review to
offer a deﬁnitive explanation for these ﬁndings, it is important to note
that priming can lead to both assimilation as well as contrast as a function
of how the stimuli are seen (i.e., as similar or not to the target, or from
in-groups vs. outgroups—e.g., for a review, see Hall and Crisp, 2008).
Moreover, when it comes to self-reported outcomes, the issue of reference group effects is a pervasive confound, particularly in cross-cultural
comparisons (e.g., Heine et al., 2002).

Table 2
Summary of common class or status-based manipulations.
Manipulations
involving class

Cultural
construct

Procedure

Manipulation
check/effect of
manipulation

Source

Subjective
social class

SES

Participants
were told to
compare
themselves
with people at
the very top or
very bottom of
the social
ladder and
describe an
interaction
with such a
person,

Kraus et al.
(2010); Piff
et al. (2010)

Objective
social class

Social
status

Participants
were randomly
assigned to
received the
Rolls Royce
game piece or
shoe piece at
the beginning
of a game of
Monopoly or
not.
Additionally,
high vs. low
status
condition
participants:
received $2000
vs. $1000 to
start the game,
rolled 2 dice vs.
1, collected
$200 vs. 100
when passing
“Go,” and could
roll their way
out of jail or
now.
Participants
played an
XBOX
volleyball game
where they
were assigned
to win or lose
by being in the
hardest or
easiest
difﬁculty
settings.

Participants
ranked their
own standing
lower in the
lower class rank
condition, and
vice versa for
those in the
upper class rank
condition; those
in the lower
class conditions
showed more
empathic
accuracy (Kraus
et al., 2010) and
pro sociality
(Piff et al., 2010)
Participants in
the low status
condition: had
less Monopoly
earnings at the
end of the game
than those in the
high status
condition;
consumed more
calories,
including more
calories from
saturated fat and
more sodium;
reported less
pride and
powerfulness.

Participants
differed in their
percentage of
matches won as
a function of
condition; this
experimentally
manipulated
status also
moderated the
link between
facial width to
height ratio and
risk-taking
Those assigned
more points
performed
better on the
reaction time
task than those
assigned fewer
points.
Participants
rated the
outgroup to be
smarter or less
smart as a

Welker et al.
(2015)

3. Class-based manipulations
Manipulations involving class, although more limited, are overall less
prone to measurement issues given that all manipulations typically
involve a direct social comparison on a concrete outcome (e.g., real or
imaginary money and resources); for a full summary, see Table 2. In the
same way that most ethnicity-based manipulations involve a crosscultural comparison between a more interdependent, collectivistic culture (e.g., East-Asian) and European-American culture, virtually all manipulations involving class require a comparison with either a higher or
lower class group or person.

Social
status

3.1. Manipulating subjective vs. objective class or status
The most direct example of this are manipulations targeting subjective social class, where participants are explicitly asked to compare
themselves with those at the very top or bottom of a social ladder and
imagine interacting with such people (Kraus et al., 2010; Piff et al.,
2010). This type of social comparison manipulation has also been used in
studies of SES-based stereotype threat: for example, to activate the saliency of SES prior to an exam, participants were told that their exam
scores would be compared to either someone much higher or much lower
than them in terms of income/education/prestige (John-Henderson et
al., 2014).
Alternatively, in manipulations involving objective social class—i.e.,
in paradigms where there are allocations of actual resources being

Relative social
standing

Social
status

Participants
were assigned
many or few
points during
reaction time
task in a group
setting

Group
status

Participants
received false
feedback that
they were
smarter or less

Cardel
(2016)
using
procedures
originally
developed
by Piff et al.

O'Connell
(1980)

Doosje,
Ellemers &
Spears
(1995)

(continued on next page)
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where the level of analyses takes place at the level of the person. In the
paradigms involving group superiority or inferiority—where the
approach is by deﬁnition allocentric—the implication of socioeconomic
status is arguably more salient given that the ethnic groups compared
almost always diverge socioeconomically, although this feature may not
necessarily be explicit. That said, status and SES need not necessarily
overlap (e.g., one can be highly respected and famous in a ﬁeld that does
not pay well), and may be confounded with related variables like control;
thus, future studies involving such manipulations require careful,
nuanced manipulation checks to pinpoint the precise constructs that are
being altered.
As a related point, in these group comparisons, further distinctions
can be made between SES classes that differ in their actual ﬁnancial resources (e.g., working versus upper classes, or ethnic groups that are
socioeconomically different in the real world—like in the case of Bohon
et al., 1993) and social groups that differ in status (e.g., between majors
that differ in ascriptions of intelligence—Doosje et al., 1995; universities
that differ in perceived prestige or success—Platow et al., 2005). Even
though the manipulations across these contexts may look similar (i.e.,
usually involving being told that one's group was inferior or superior), it
is possible that the impact of being told one's ethnic group is better/worse
is different than being told one's major or school is better/worse.

Table 2 (continued )
Manipulations
involving class

Perceptions of
status of a
target

Cultural
construct

Procedure

Manipulation
check/effect of
manipulation

smart than an
outgroup

function of the
condition; group
status
inﬂuenced
subsequent
ratings of
intragroup
variability
Participants
were asked to
answer yes/no
to the question
of whether their
in-group was
thought as
higher/lower
status; this
subsequently
inﬂuenced selfesteem changes
in response to
discrimination
Self-esteem was
lower among
participants in
the low status
condition
compared to
those in the high
status and no
status conditions

Group
status

Participants
were told that a
newspaper
report said
their group had
higher status
(i.e., related to
obtaining fulltime jobs)
relative to an
outgroup

Group
status

Participants
were told that
their ethnic
group or an
outgroup
performed
better or worse
on an
experimental
task according
to past
research, or
given no status
information
Male and
female
photographed
targets were
shown either in
a high status
(Bentley) or
low status
(Ford) car

SES

Male targets in
high status cars
were rated by
women as
higher in
attractiveness
than those in
low status cars

Source

Platow et al.
(2005)

Bohon,
Singer &
Santos
(1993)

3.2. Class-based outcome measures
Regardless of whether it is subjective or objective class and whether
comparisons with another person or group is explicit or implicit, all these
aforementioned manipulations target participants' perceptions of themselves or their own social group. This, of course, is distinct from the
related but distinct body of literature on manipulations of perceived
status or class of targets, which oftentimes can rely on similar methods
(i.e., exposure to class icons like high or low status cars—Dunn & Searle,
2010) but tap a different psychological construct. Despite the similarity
across techniques in manipulating participants' own class, however, the
outcomes produced by such manipulations vary widely, including prosociality (e.g., opinions about the percentage of one's income that should
be donated to charity—Piff et al., 2010), empathic accuracy (e.g., reading
the emotional expression of photographed actors—Kraus et al., 2010),
food consumption (Cardel, 2016), performance (O'Connell, 1980) and
risk-taking (albeit this interacted with other factors—Welker et al.,
2015), in addition to general feelings or perceptions about the self and
ingroup (e.g., Bohon et al., 1993; Doosje et al., 1995; Platow et al., 2005).
Those that have included manipulation checks have consistently found
the expected effects in terms of participants' perceptions of their own
social standing (e.g., self-reported rankings of their own class or their
ingroup's status in cases where the manipulation targeted subjective
class—Bohon et al., 1993; Doosje et al., 1995; Kraus et al., 2010; Piff
et al., 2010; Platow et al., 2005), and task performance in cases where the
manipulation targeted more objective indices of status or rank—for
example, by manipulating standing in a laboratory task (e.g., O'Connell,
1980; Welker et al., 2015) or changing one's relative deprivation
compared to another group (e.g., Callan et al., 2011; Grant and Brown,
1995; to name a few).

Dunn &
Searle
(2010)

manipulated—the comparisons are more implicit, but still assumed. For
example, participants playing Monopoly are assigned either the Rolls
Royce or shoe game piece, in addition to being given $2000 versus $1000
to start and collecting $200 versus $100 for passing “Go” and getting to
roll the dice to get out of jail or not (Piff, Kraus & Martinez, n.d., as cited
in Cardel, 2016). In similar paradigms, participants play other games
(e.g., a XBOX volleyball game, a reaction time task) where they are set up
to either win/lose or gain many/few points (O'Connell, 1980; Welker,
Goetz and Carre, 2015). In still other paradigms, the comparisons are
explicit but subjective rather than based on actual resources; here, the
construct at hand is always (relative) group status. In these manipulations, participants are told that they themselves or their group was better,
smarter, or higher status than an outgroup (e.g., Bohon et al., 1993;
Doosje, Ellemers & Spears, 1995; Platow et al., 2005).
It is important to note that across these latter paradigms, the question
of whether winning, gaining points, or being told one is superior in status
or skill is necessarily a reﬂection of class is an open one that is subject to
interpretation. In the paradigms involving games or game-like tasks (be
in Monopoly, a virtual volleyball game, or a reaction time task), it may be
more accurate to say that these are, strictly speaking, manipulations of
status in general rather than socioeconomic status in particular. Moreover, status in these cases are individualistic or idiocentric ascriptions,

4. Gender-based manipulations
Manipulations involving gender typically fall in three categories:
manipulation of gender roles, activation of gender identity salience, and
administration of sex hormones. The impact of these vary: while those
involving direct administration of sex hormones are direct and measurable, those involving salience of gender roles or identity often entail less
clear measures. For a summary, see Table 3.
It is also important to note that the term “gender” typically refers to
the sociocultural differences that are often observed between men and
women whereas the term “sex” more frequently refers to the more
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Table 3
Summary of common manipulations involving gender differences.
Manipulations
involving gender
differences

Cultural construct

Procedure

Manipulation check/effect of manipulation

Source

Gender roles

Gender role
salience

Those in the progressive condition rated gender roles
as having disadvantages compare to those in the
traditional condition, but these interacted with
gender identity.

Becker & Wagner
(2009)

Gender identity

Gender identity
salience
Gender identity
threat

Participants read texts about either progressive or
traditional gender roles (i.e., about the feminist
movement in decline or in a boom and whether
women are living more or less in line with
traditional gender roles). In a second study, they
focused on the advantages of being a woman (in the
traditional gender role condition) or the
disadvantages of the traditional gender roles of
women.
Participants report their gender or not before an
experimental task
Participants are told they are either the 37th or 83rd
percentile on a test about gender-stereotypical
topics in relation to other men in the study

Women who reported their gender were prone to
stereotype threat effects
Men were asked to report their score on the test (as a
manipulation check); this interacted with a sexuality
assertion manipulation to inﬂuence aggression and
sexual prejudice.
Those in the feminine condition rated themselves
higher on communal traits while those in the
masculine condition rated themselves higher on
masculine ones; condition interacted with gender to
inﬂuence responses to messages about consumer
products (Meyers-Levy, 1988)
Menopausal women showed less cardiovascular
stress after being administered estradiol/
progesterone compared to a placebo
Men administered testosterone showed more neural
activity in threat processing areas of the brain
Men administered testosterone showed
improvements in mood, lean body mass, and sexual
function
Androgel did not change ratings of or implicit
attitudes towards status symbols but did eliminate
pre-existing differences based on digit ratio
Testosterone concentrations increased 1 h and 2 h
after administration; Androgel led to greater
utilitarian judgments on certain types of moral
dilemmas and less utilitarianism on other types.
Androgen increased actual testosterone and made
men less generous in economic games (Zak et al.,
2009) as well as more prone to the decoy effect

Spencer et al.
(1999)
Bosson et al., 2012

Sex hormones

Gender identity
prime

Participants read about the virtues of being
concerned about others and being nurturing
(feminine gender identity) vs. being independent
and self-sufﬁcient (masculine gender identity), and
then wrote about embodying those qualities

Extradiol/
progesterone
administration
Testosterone
administration

Menopausal women were administered either
estrogen, progesterone, or placebo and given a
mental stress test.
Men were given a gonadotropin releasing hormonee
antagonist and then administered testosterone
Men were administered transdermal testosterone for
180 days using T gel or T patch.
Men were given a single dose of Androgel or a
control gel; 2D:4D (digit) ratios were also measured
Same as above

Men were given a single dose of Androgel or a
control gel

Meyers-Levy
(1988); Winterich
et al. (2009)

Del Rio et al. (1998)

Goetz et al. (2014)
Wang et al. (2000)

Wu et al. (2017)

Arnocky et al.
(2017)

Liao et al. (2018);
Zak et al. (2009)

Estes and Felker (2012) found that by simply telling participants that
they were either above or below average on visual judgment task
involving the length of lines, those in the high conﬁdence condition (i.e.,
who were told they were above average) performed better on a subsequent mental rotation task compared to those in the low conﬁdence
condition. Strikingly, this manipulation also was effective in eliminating
gender differences, such that highly conﬁdent women performed similar
to lowly conﬁdent men (Estes and Felker, 2012).
This gender stereotype activation paradigm is similar to the numerous
manipulations that have been well-documented by the stereotype threat
literature, which have shown similar effects. In the context of spatial
reasoning, women primed to think of themselves as students were better
at mental rotation than those primed to think of themselves in terms of
their gender (or a different, non-stereotype relevant identity; McGlone
and Aronson, 2006). This is also consistent with a host of other studies
showing that manipulating features of the situation (similar to Yamagishi
et al.‘s approach to manipulating culture via situational demands) can
also activate behavior that are either consistent with or counter to stereotypes (e.g., diagnosticity to the task, the gender of the interviewer—McGlone et al., 2006). Stereotype threat paradigms will also be
revisited below in discussion of gender role identity.

biologically-based differences between the two; however, others have
argued that this may be an arbitrary distinction given that biology and
sociocultural inﬂuences mutually inﬂuence one another (for a review, see
Hyde et al., 2019). Given the growing body of evidence suggesting that
sex hormones, which were previously assumed to be innate and biological, are actually susceptible to a variety of social and contextual cues
(Hyde et al., 2019), these are further reasons to include a discussion of
hormonal manipulation in this discussion of experimental paradigms
involving gender.
4.1. Activating gender stereotypes
Similar to the previously discussed paradigms involving priming
ethnicity or activating culturally-dependent variables, a number of
studies have taken a parallel approach with gender by activating gender
stereotypes. For example, the gender stereotype activating task by Ortner
and Sieverding (2008) involved presenting participants with a vignette
about a so-called typical day in the life of a man or a woman that involved
engaging in a variety of gender-stereotypical positive behaviors (e.g.,
caring for others in the case of the woman; being a leader who takes risks
in the case of the man); afterwards, participants were also imagined
themselves as this person and describe him/her. This manipulation was
effective: both men and women performed worse on a mental rotation
task after the female prime, whereas the male prime eliminated the
gender difference between groups (Ortner and Sieverding, 2008).
Interestingly, other paradigms have managed to elicit the same results
without activating gender directly but instead manipulating conﬁdence.

4.2. Manipulating gender roles & identity
To illustrate a paradigmatic example of manipulations involving
gender roles, Meyers-Levy (1988) subtly manipulated gender role
salience by asking participants about their agreement with
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because social and biological factors invariably interact to produce cultural differences. That said, hormonal manipulations do fall under a
unique category of “cultural” manipulations in that unlike the other
manipulations discussed so far (i.e., involving social group membership
in general or speciﬁc cultural features in particular, like thinking styles,
self-construals, values, roles, relative standing and the like), its basis is
biological rather than social in nature.
Unlike the discussion of race/ethnicity and class, gender is also
unique as a social group in that it involves biological differences the ﬁrst
place—most notably, those related to sex hormones like testosterone,
progesterone, and estrogen. Thus, manipulations involving the administration of such hormones appear to offer a clear-cut way of demonstrating which observed gender differences can be attributed, at least in
part, to biological factors and not merely differences in socialization,
exposure, norms, and stereotypes. The ﬁndings on exogenous hormone
administration appear to mirror the substantive body of work on the links
between endogenous hormone levels and a host of psychological and
physical outcomes, including those related to health (e.g., cardiovascular
health—for review, see Vitale et al., 2009), mood and sexuality (e.g.,
Wang et al., 2000), and threat processing (e.g., Goetz et al., 2014).
It is important to note, however, that not all studies involving hormone administration are true experiments; a few of these studies have
relied on pre-post test comparisons of self-selected individuals such as
transgender patients undergoing sex hormone treatment (e.g., van Goozen et al., 1995) or post-menopausal women undergoing hormone therapy (e.g., see Vitale et al., 2009). In such cases, hormone administration
may be inﬂuenced by other related factors like gender identity (for
example, in the case of transgender patients and hormone injections).
True experiments involving hormone administrations (e.g., doubleblind, placebo control) using Androgel highlight many of the same issues raised previously with manipulations of gender identity or roles,
particularly in terms of how experimental manipulations can interact
with pre-existing individual differences related to gender. To illustrate,
despite the well-established link between testosterone and status seeking,
experimental administration of Androgel, compared to a control gel, did
not increase men's ratings of, or implicit associations with, status objects
(e.g., high status cars), but did interact with prenatal androgen exposure
as measured by 2D:4D digit ratios, such that previous differences in
implicit status attitudes between men with larger vs. smaller ratios disappeared when Androgel was administered (Wu et al., 2017). However,
the studies relying on the same paradigm in a different context—in this
case, moral judgments—did ﬁnd a causal main effect of testosterone
administration, with no evidence of it interacting with digit ratio or
baseline testosterone (Arnocky et al., 2017). Other experiments using
Androgel have also found it to exert the same pattern of effects as
endogenous testosterone in correlational studies (e.g., Liao et al., 2018;
Zak et al., 2009). Yet a recent large-scale study of exogenous testosterone
administration found little effect of the hormone on cognitive reﬂection,
despite previous studies suggesting there was (Knight et al., 2020).
Taken together, these ﬁndings on the effects of Androgel administration are generally consistent with the broader idea that the sociallytransmitted aspects of culture interact with biological factors linked to
group membership. Just as previous work has shown that culture (in the
form of self-identiﬁed ethnicity) interacts with genes to produce differences in social behaviors like support-seeking and emotion regulation
(Kim et al., 2010, 2011), the hormonal administration literature likewise
suggests that the biological correlates of sex (e.g., androgens) can, under
certain but not all contexts, can interact with pre-existing individual
differences to inﬂuence behavior.

stereotypically male—agentic—or female—communal—traits; although
this gender role prime interacted with other variables in the study (e.g.,
self vs. other-oriented messages about a consumer product and
self-reported gender), this type of manipulation assumes that activating
communal and agentic concerns is equivalent to activating gender roles
more broadly. Subsequent studies using the same prime (e.g., Winterich,
Mittal & Ross, 2009) found that, as expected, the primes shaped participants’ ratings of their own communal and agentic traits and once again
interacted with other variables—in this case, moral identity—to shape
charitable behavior. Similar to the concerns with manipulations
involving ethnic culture, the central issue at hand involves the question
of whether activating one feature of this social group membership—like
traits involving communion or agency—can be interpreted as activating
other features related to being a member of said group.
Moreover, gender role and gender identity may interact: for example,
when participants were assigned to read texts that manipulated the types
of gender roles described for women (i.e., from a feminist or traditional
perspective), the manipulation changed perceptions of gender roles in
the anticipated direction, but whether the participants (in this case,
women) rejected sexism after reading such passages depended on their
own level of gender identiﬁcation (Becker and Wagner, 2009).
Along a related vein, the large and substantive body of literature on
gender stereotypes, particularly stereotype threat, has demonstrated that
activating the saliency of stereotypical roles associated with gender may
lead to distancing oneself from one's gender identity—a reaction referred
to as the “Queen Bee phenomenon” or self-group distancing (e.g., see
Derks et al., 2015 for review). Other studies on stereotype threat have
further shown that the strength of one's gender identiﬁcation in the ﬁrst
place can moderate these reactions to stereotype threat (e.g., Schmader,
2002). Moreover, what is considered threatening appears to differ based
on the gender at hand: while the studies targeting women being threatened typically involve the aforementioned stereotype threat effects (i.e.,
manipulations involving reminders of one's gender or the stereotypes
associated with one's gender), studies on gender threat among men
oftentimes involve descriptions of gender atypicality—for example,
being told that one was unlike other men in the study (e.g., Bosson,
Weaver, Caswell & Burnaford, 2012). Taken together, these considerations suggest that these subjective manipulations involving gender
identity, roles, or threats may be highly complex, subject to a host of
possible moderators; their effects may depend largely on the speciﬁc
gender being targeted, individual differences of the participant's
pre-existing attitudes towards their own gender, and other experimental
factors.
4.3. Hormone-based manipulations
At ﬁrst glance, the inclusion of hormonal administration in the examination of cultural manipulations involving gender might seem surprising given that the long-standing assumption is that culture refers to
the socially transmitted features of a shared environment rather than the
biologically transmitted factors. However, more recent work has highlighted the fact that socio-cultural and biological processes (e.g., genes)
interact to produce the observed behavioral differences between populations (e.g., Kim et al., 2010; Kim et al., 2011; Sasaki et al., 2011).
Along parallel lines, other studies have demonstrated that the social
features of gender (e.g., the distinct emotional lives of men and women)
are based in underlying biological systems (e.g., behavioral inhibition
versus activation; Ma-Kellams and Wu, 2020). These ﬁndings are
consistent with the theory of culture-gene coevolution, which has been
demonstrated in not only humans, but other species as well (e.g., Lachlan
and Slater, 1999). Although genes represent more enduring differences
between individuals than hormones, which may be more variable or
state-dependent, both represent biological markers than can shift (i.e., be
turned on/off in the context of genes, or change in the context of hormones). Thus, manipulations involving biological markers of gender (i.e.,
sex hormones) are included in the discussion of cultural manipulations

5. Interim summary: culture, revisited
In reviewing the literature on experimental manipulations involving
“culture” in its various forms and contexts, one potential source of tension emerges: how is culture different from any other type of group
membership? To be fair, most of the cross-cultural literature is quasi9
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interdependence) can inﬂuence related constructs like attention (Kühnen
et al., 2001). Although this ﬁnding conﬁrms the challenges of priming
precise and singular cultural concepts in isolation, it is not inconsistent
with the theoretical conceptualization of culture, which asserts that
culture stands as integrated meaning systems that involve not one, but
multiple aspects of the human psyche (Betancourt and Lopez, 1993;
Lehman et al., 2004; Rohner, 1984; Triandis, 1993). Nevertheless, to
establish more clearly delineated models of cultural priming, future
studies should attempt to include more comprehensive manipulation
checks to assess the boundary conditions of cultural manipulations. For
example, a thinking style manipulation (e.g., for holistic or linear
thinking) should involve a subsequent assessment of whether said
manipulation inﬂuenced not just the way participants processed information, but also their values, self-construals, and identity. Otherwise, it
would be difﬁcult to deﬁnitively determine whether any observed differences in the outcome measure of interest was the direct product of the
thinking style manipulation or other associated facets of culture that
were simultaneously activated.

experimental insofar as its reliance on self-identiﬁed group memberships
on the basis of race/ethnicity, class and gender to predict differences in
outcomes. Thus, a review of the empirical methods to study culture
would suggest that in many contexts, culture and group membership
have been used interchangeably. However, as the study of cultural psychology has evolved, so has its methods and models; as a result, the focus
of cultural psychological studies has shifted towards pinpointing more
precise mechanisms that can explain these observed differences between
groups—an evolution that Heine and Norenzayan (2006) described as
Stage 1 versus Stage 2. To this end, studies relying on experimental
manipulations of culture have increasingly been included in order to
elucidate the processes at play in producing cultural differences. After all,
groups can differ in a myriad of ways, and not all of these differences are
necessarily cultural in nature (an argument that has long been put forth
by the “culture as situation cognition” framework (Oyersman and Lee,
2007) and the institutional approach to culture (Yamagishi et al., 2008)).
Thus, in order to eliminate the confounds invariably present when
making comparisons across groups, cultural manipulations have been
used in the attempt to more precisely test the causal link between a
speciﬁc facet of culture–be it culturally bound situational demands,
thinking styles, self-construals, perception of resources or status, identity,
or roles—and the outcome at hand.
These attempts, in turn, have not been without their own issues of
validity–the most problematic of which centers around the question of
whether some of the aforementioned cultural primes are actually priming
anything speciﬁc or just a general, fuzzy notion of culture and all its
potential correlates. This broader methodological (and theoretical)
question of what priming paradigms are actually priming is not speciﬁc
to cultural psychology, but rather, is a recurrent issue in social psychology that highlights the paucity of well-articulated theories about priming's effects and how or why they are achieved (Cesario, 2014). As the
commentary on priming effects in the social behavioral sciences illustrate, many priming effects depend on the particular and sometimes
idiosyncratic associations individuals have with the speciﬁc stimuli used,
and as a result, are subject to a host of moderating factors, many of which
have to do with culture (for review, see Cesario, 2014).
In summary, the cultural manipulations literature faces both broad,
paradigmatic questions about the very deﬁnition of culture and speciﬁc
methodological questions about which facets of culture are being activated in any given manipulation. Below, I highlight several of these
limitations and offer potential future directions for subsequent research.

6.2. Appropriate control groups
The question of appropriate control groups applies across manipulations as well. In the context of ethnicity, the most commonly used control
group is almost always a feature of (European)-Americans—for example,
analytic thinking, independence, American icons, or the English language. While this is a logical and meaningful comparison, it nevertheless
reﬂects a Eurocentric approach (see Heine and Norenzayan, 2006). More
nuanced understanding of ethnic culture could result from using additional comparisons with other ethnic groups—for example, in the case of
cultural icons, comparing images from multiple cultures, and not just
East-West; in the case of activating cultural concepts, using control
groups where other culturally-bound schemas are activated (e.g.,
including thinking primes in a paradigm testing self-construal primes) in
order to elucidate the speciﬁcity of the effects found.
Similarly, in the context of class, the comparison is typically between
high versus low status manipulations, and middle-class or no status is
rarely used as a control group, raising questions about whether the effects
of class are more driven by high status or low, or both. Including a middle
class or moderate status control group could be especially useful in
demonstrating whether these effects are driven more by high or low
status salience.
Finally, in the context of gender, the nature of the control group
varies: while studies involving gender-related threat and hormone
administration typically include a true control group where no manipulation is given (e.g., no reminders about one's gender or a placebo),
studies involving gender roles or identity usually compare opposing roles
or identities (e.g., traditional versus modern gender roles; more or less
stereotypical gender ratings); thus, in the latter cases, it is difﬁcult to
ascertain the extent to which divergent reactions to the manipulations
are driven by cues from one gender or another. Moreover, given the fact
that not all individuals identify their gender in binary ways (for review,
see Richards et al., 2016), future studies should consider including
additional, more inclusive experimental conditions—for example, manipulations that focus on gender ﬂuidity or nonbinary identities. Another
alternative control condition could be one that downplays or deconstructs the notion of gender in the ﬁrst place; doing so would reveal
the extent to which any effects are driven by stereotypes about gender.

6. Limitations and future directions
6.1. Measurement issues & generalizability
One issue that remains across manipulations is whether manipulating
one aspect associated with culture (e.g., individualism-collectivism,
language, thinking style, social role, identity, status) necessarily implicates other aspects of culture and therefore can be used to make broader
generalizations about enduring cultural differences. This question, of
course, is not speciﬁc to culture and can be considered in the larger
context of whether a temporary state can be used to make inferences
about stable features of social group membership. However, this limitation is especially important in the context of culture because culture itself
is multi-faceted and complex. As the research on gender identity and
threat shows, even related constructs within the realm of social group
membership can interact and the same manipulation can lead to divergent outcomes as a function of pre-existing differences (e.g., gender
threat leads highly identiﬁed versus lowly identiﬁed women to respond
differently—Becker & Wagner, 2009).
This methodological issue is also tied to the larger question of
whether it is even possible to prime one aspect of culture without also
priming other, related aspects of culture. This problem is not merely
speculative; existing studies have already shown that priming culturallybound self-construal (e.g., individualism/collectivism, or independence/

6.3. Intersectionality
A growing body of literature in psychology has highlighted the reality
of intersectionality, or the notion that identities—including the ones
related to race, sex, and class—are not separate, but interconnected (for
review, see Rosenthal, 2016). Most of the work on intersectionality focuses on the oppression experienced by members of (oftentimes multiple)
underrepresented or marginalized groups, and many of such studies have
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relied on qualitative (e.g., Thomas et al., 2011) or non-experimental
approaches (e.g., Mahalingam et al., 2008; for reviews, see Cole, 2009
and Rosenthal, 2016). Relatively few studies have attempted to tackle
intersectionality using true experimental designs, but this represents a
potentially fruitful arena for further study. Future work can attempt to
manipulate more than one identity or cultural group membership
simultaneously to test the precise interactions at play between race,
gender and class.
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7. Conclusion
Race, gender and class: despite the long-standing assumption that
individuals are born into some of these social group memberships (most
notably, race and gender; to a lesser degree, class), the psychological
manipulation literature reviewed here has demonstrated that it is
possible to manipulate each of these constructs. As forms of culture,
broadly deﬁned, they each entail deﬁning values, roles, self-construals,
thinking styles, and behavior practices that can be targeted in experimental paradigms through techniques like autobiographical reﬂection,
explicit instruction, priming, language, persuasive text, imagery, social
comparison, laboratory games, fabricated feedback, and exogenous
administration. Despite the breadth of this literature, however, more
studies are needed to test the boundary conditions of these manipulations
and the extent to which manipulations targeting one feature of cultural
group membership necessarily impacts other features. Culture, after all,
is more than just how a person thinks or what language they speak,
whether they see themselves as independent or interdependent,
communal or agentic, high status or low; thus, more evidence is needed
to make the epistemic leap that a manipulation which only (temporarily)
taps one cultural construct can be construed as changing a person's
broader, more stable cultural identity or membership.
Furthermore, culture is also relative, and differences are most salient
when comparisons between groups are made. The kinds of control groups
employed in the existing literature have largely been limited to a small
handful of comparisons: to European/North-Americans, upper class individuals, and to men. Thus, future research should broaden the considerations for what could be considered an “appropriate” control group
to go beyond the previously Eurocentric, binary approaches. The world,
after all, is large, and the number of social groups, a multitude; experimental designs, therefore, should strive to more accurately reﬂect the
complexity and nuances of the actual group memberships individuals
identify with.
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